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ABSTRACT 
Stochastic agro-economic model GLOBIOM is used to demonstrate how best to design and 
evaluate the CAP’s financial and structural measures, both individually and jointly, in the face of 
inherent uncertainty and risk. The model accounts for plausible shocks simultaneously and 
derives measures that are robust against all shock scenarios; it can thus help avoid the 
irreversibility and sunk costs that occur in unexpected scenarios.To allow adequate agricultural 
production, we show that the distribution of CAP funds needs to account for exposure to risks, 
security targets, and the synergies between policy measures, including production, trade, storage, 
and irrigation technologies.
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1. Introduction 
Climate change and variability are expected to have significant (Heal and Kriström 2002) and 
highly uncertain impacts on agricultural production and the utilization of natural 
resources,affecting food, water, environmental, and (bio)energy(FWEE) security at national and 
regional levels, with the potential for world-wide spillovers(OECD2009; Ray et al. 2015). 
Different regions will be subject to different types of exposure. To ensure adequate agricultural 
production and thus food security at the level of EU countries and main economic regions, an 
analysis of local agricultural adaptation strategies have to be esigned and implemented to tackle 
uncertainties: such strategies include decisions on governmental regulations, investment in and 
                                                          
1Research is funded by ECONADAPT (603906), AGRICISTRADE (612755), COACCH (776479) EU FP7 
projects.  
2 
 
reform of water management, land use practices, agrofood production patterns, and food trade 
regulations(European Commission 2009a).  
It has been emphasized that climate adaptation is a major concern of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU). In the proposed CAP regulations for 2014–2020, 
adaptation has gained great prominence, with ―the sustainable use of natural resources and 
climate action‖being one of the core objectives. Proper appraisal of CAP policies can increase 
the productive capacity and viability of the agricultural land–based sectors of the EU faced with 
climate change and variability (European Commission 2013). 
In this paper, we study synergies and trade-offs among different measures of the new Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP); our aim is to identify the principles that can ensure the most effective 
distribution of CAP funds to achieve optimal climate change adaptation in the face of inherent 
uncertainty and risk.  
The CAP is organized into two pillars. The measures supported under the first pillar are financial, 
and can be defined as short-term. While these can be instantly reversed or adjusted to react to 
sudden production or market shocks, the effects they have can be long-lasting and even 
irreversible. The measures under the second pillar are concerned with more strategic long-term 
restructuring of local production capacities, natural resource utilization, and investments in new 
technologies that are important for reaching sustainable rural development and climate change 
adaptation goals in the longer term. Examples are grain storage, irrigation capacities, and water 
reservoirs.  
The ongoing CAP reform aims to flatten the basic payments of pillar I, so that farmers receive 
the same level of support for every hectare of eligible agricultural land across EU countries, 
independently of: i) the type of farm; ii) what crop is grown (European Commission2013); iii) 
the risks from climate change and variability; and iv) agricultural production vulnerability and 
potentials in the face of changing climate and increasing climate variability.  
This paper argues that risks and vulnerability are highly significant in the inter dependencies 
between pillar I and pillar II measures, and must therefore be properly accounted for in analyses 
of the new CAP, in particular, the optimal allocation of CAP funds between and within the 
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pillars at different levels. Traditionally, analysis and appraisal of policies by European 
Commission are based on a measure-by-measure ―what-if‖ analysis using deterministic models 
and methodologies (e.g.,CAPRI model in European Commission (2011); IFM-CAP model, JRC 
(2015); European Parlament, 2010; Gohin 2006; Balkhausen et al. 2007; Rosegrant 2012;Nelson 
et al. 2013) both for regional and farm-level analysis; scenario-dependent recommendations are 
derived.  
To derive robust conclusions, we use the stochastic agro-economic model GLOBIOM (Havlík et 
al. 2011; Ermolieva et al. 2016a). Stochastic GLOBIOM simultaneously employs different 
historical (1960–2016)yield shock scenarios in order to derive a combination of risk-hedging 
measures that are optimal and robust with respect to all scenarios (Ermoliev and Hordijk, 
2003).We show that in the presence of uncertainties, pillar I subsidies calculated using stochastic 
GLOBIOM (―robust‖)and accounting for risk exposure, profitability, and adaptive capacity of 
member states,ensure more robust agricultural production at the level of EU countries and main 
economic regions than the ―flat‖ subsidies.  
Our model results demonstrate numerically that a proper interdependent analysis and appraisal of 
the EU CAP measures under uncertainty and risks will ensure mainstreaming of climate change 
uncertainty, risk management approaches, and robust actions within the CAP implementation 
plans (European Commission 2009b). The recommendations of the stochastic model have been 
summarized in a deliverable to the EU Commission (ECONADAPT 2016; Ermolieva and 
Biewald et al. 2016b).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the new 2014–2021 CAP. 
Section 3 presents a stylized fragment of stochastic GLOBIOM, demonstrating how a proper mix 
of short-term operational and long-term strategic decisions, together with the synergies they 
create, can play a role in hedging inherent risks.  In Section 3, we also show that the optimal mix 
depends on complex non-smooth interactions among the systems, feasible adaptation measures, 
and probability distributions of uncertain parameters (e.g., yield shocks).In particular, we discuss 
that changing the structure of pillar I direct payments to a ―flat‖ rate across the EU countries 
(European Commission 2011) can have negative consequences (Helming and Peerlings 2014; 
Koundouri et al. 2009). We also identify the sources of systemic risks emerging due to potential 
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imbalances (as, for example,in demand–supply) that are catalyzed by random yield shocks. 
Section 4 outlines the scenarios of CAP measures studied individually and jointly, as well as 
selected results from the studies. A summary of conclusions is found in section 5. 
2. CAP reform 
Before using stochastic GLOBIOM to investigate inter dependencies and robust mix of CAP 
measures, we provide a summary of the new2014–2020CAP,an extended form of which is 
available in European Commission reports of 2009, 2013, 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2017. 
2.1 New CAP: Challenges and goals. 
The CAP seeks to protect viable food production, ensure sustainable management of natural 
resources, and support rural vitality by pooling European Union resources.  The total 2014–2020 
CAP accounts for about 40% of the total EU  budget. The CAP has two pillars. The first pillar 
includes direct payments and market measures. Under pillar I about €58 billion in subsidies is 
distributed to farmers, generating about 2% of EU GDP.  French farmers receive the most 
subsidies with about 17% of CAP payments, followed by Spain (13%), Germany (12%), Italy 
(10.6%), and the UK (7%). Larger producers receive more from the CAP than small farmers; 
about 80% of aid goes to about 25%  of EU farmers. Pillar II is funded through the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), which was worth about €100 billion from 
2014–2020. Each EU country receives a financial allocation for the 7-year period (European 
Commission, Rural development, 2014-2020). Member states and regions elaborate their rural 
development programs based on their own needs and on EU priorities, for example, enhancing 
the viability and competitiveness of all types of agriculture; promoting innovative farm 
technologies and sustainable forest management; fostering knowledge and innovation in 
agriculture, forestry, and rural areas; promoting food chain organization, animal welfare, and risk 
management in agriculture; restoring, preserving, and enhancing ecosystems related to 
agriculture and forestry; promoting resource efficiency and supporting the shift toward a low-
carbon and climate-resilient economy in the agriculture, food, and forestry sectors; and 
promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction, and economic development in rural areas. 
One of the challenges identified in the 2014–2020 CAP is to maintain food security, which has 
once again become an issue with food prices rising in recent years.A major focus of the new 
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CAP is on the adoption of actions aimed at climate change management and the promotion of the 
sustainable management of natural resources.  
2.2 Direct subsidies (pillar I).  
Direct annual payments  to farmers are provided to help stabilize farm revenues under bad 
weather conditions and potentially volatile markets. The payments, which aim to incentivize 
farmers to demonstrate good environmental behavior,can be considered as a reward to farmers 
for providing environmentally friendly ―services‖ such as preservation of good practices, 
increasing farmland biodiversity, and hedging against climate change risks. They also aim to 
support farmers’ incomes and enhance food security. Under the 2003 reforms, direct payments 
were decoupled from production but linked to eligible farmland. Countries could choose what 
defined eligible farmland based on i) farm-specific ―historic‖ reference amounts; ii) regional 
reference margins; or iii) a hybrid of the historic regional references (European Commission, 
2014). While the European Commission expressed a preference for ii), the majority of countries 
opted for i) (Matthews et al. 2013). Under the ―historic‖ approach, only land growing specific 
crops was considered eligible for fixed payments (€/ha) and these varied according to crop, 
based on historic 2000–2002 yields.  
The CAP reform of 2013 introduced a basic payment scheme that would provide the same 
―flat‖level of support to every hectare of agricultural land within a region, irrespective i)of the 
type of farm or crop grown (European Commission, 2013);and ii) of the regional production 
potentials or risks.  
While the flattening of subsidies can introduce more fairness into agriculture, it can also distort 
the attainability of other important CAP objectives, for example: i) promoting technical progress 
to increase agricultural productivity while trying to ensure  optimum use of the factors of 
production, in particular, labor; ii)  stabilizing markets—a crucial challenge, given the frequent 
alternation between sharp increases in global food prices and severe price depression;  iii)  
ensuring supply availability; and iv)  ensuring reasonable prices for consumers. 
We argue that,  to achieve sustainable agricultural production in the EU,payments have to 
account for i) the local and global risks that characterize farmers’ exposure;ii)the vulnerability 
and/or profitability; and iii) technological potential of locations. 
6 
 
In section 3we explain how robust payments (Figure 1) can be calculated with stochastic 
GLOBIOM,and in section 4wecompare the effects of the ―robust‖ payments with the other two 
types of payment; in other words,  we compare the effects of the following payments: i) 
payments based on farm-specific historical reference amounts that were in place before the 2013 
CAP reform (Commission, 2011); ii) the flat-rate payments, introduced in the 2013 CAP reform; 
and iii) a robust approach, based on calculations with stochastic GLOBIOM, taking into account 
risk exposure, profitability, and adaptive capacity of member states. 
2.3 Rural development (pillar II).  
Pillar II finances long-term projects, for example, investments in advanced irrigation and water-
saving technologies, and grain and water storage infrastructure.The economic measures of pillar 
II aim to contribute to the sustainable development of a region by improving the stability of 
economic returns. For example, grain storage allows harvested products to be preserved and 
delivered when most needed, such as transferring grains from good to bad years to ensure food–
feed–bio fuel–water security. As storage  hedges production risks, it also reduces the demand for 
other climate change adaptation and risk hedging measures, both financial and structural, for 
instance, by reducing the commitment of arable land to production and thus the impact of 
agriculture on the environment.  
Advances in water technologies are also an important part of pillar II measures. Agriculture is a 
major consumer of water,  placing a large burden on available water resources and threatening 
water security. While proper irrigation can be beneficial to regional sustainability and provide 
greater yield stability under variable weather conditions, it can also lead to negative impacts, 
especially in water-scarce areas with multiple water-dependent systems (IEEP 2000), where the 
over consumption of water by one sector  (e.g., agriculture) can lead to water shortages and 
systemic failures in another (Ermolieva et al., 2016).  
2.4 Synergies between land use systems and adaptation measures.  
Because of the existing inter dependencies, the ways in which CAP policies will evolve in one 
region will likely have implications for other regions and globally. The implementation of CAP 
measures could alter regional land uses and trigger changes in other regions. For example, direct 
payments or other available forms of income support (for instance, state or private insurance, 
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subsidies, etc.) will guarantee some income and compensate for some potential production losses. 
Farmers can thus be less concerned about production risks, and this could discourage them from 
maintaining a certain production level or investing in longer-term risk-hedging structural 
measures, such as grain or water storage, to reduce vulnerability to climate risks.  
It can be argued  that ensuring the security of production by means of a structural measure can 
reduce or eliminate the need for other measures. On the other hand, if climate change and 
production risks associated with, for example, weather vulnerability are not as severe as expected, 
investments used to implement the adaptation may be lost. Pillar II measures may thus divert 
capital (funds) from other projects and lead to sunk costs should climate change or weather 
variability not be as severe as expected.If the combination of financial and structural measures is 
inadequate, there could be decreasing production, tightening agricultural markets, increasing 
prices, a stimulus to land expansion, increasing environmental pollution, and misuse of water for 
irrigation. 
3. Analysis of CAP measures using stochastic GLOBIOM  
How can an optimal and robust portfolio of interdependent measures be evaluated in the face of 
uncertainties and risks? In this section, similar to (Ermolieva et al., 2016), we use a stylized 
version of stochastic GLOBIOM model in order to illustrate how different types of 
decisions,uncertainties and risks interact with and can affect one another. We emphasise, 
contrary to the results of CAPRI model (European Commission, 2011),that considerations of 
risks and slight alteration of costs, e.g. by changing subsidies structure, can affect production 
allocation by regions (farmers). We also show that explicit accounting for risks will alter the 
composition of production units and their intensification levels towards more robust and risk-
adjusted levels.  
ement __ 
3.1 Modeling inter dependencies between CAP measures: Strategic and operational 
decisions 
Stochastic GLOBIOM is a complex multi-region model incorporating various agricultural goods 
and production and processing systems. To show the inter dependencies between risks and 
different measures as they are introduced in stochastic GLOBIOM, this section uses its stylized 
version with only two regions (or producers), 2,1i ,  producing the same good (grain or 
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livestock commodities). Let 
ix  denote the production level of i -th region. In general, the 
variable can also stand for the amount of land allocated for production. The costs of region i  per 
unit of produce (or hectare) are denoted by 
ic  and bcc  21 , i.e., the second region has higher 
costs. The goal of the production is to satisfy the exogenous inelastic demand d . Because of 
climate change and weather variability, production can be distorted by shocks )(1 a  and )(2 a , 
1)(0  ia , 1,2=i ,where   represents stochastic events such as droughts, heavy 
precipitation, and increasing instances of crop and livestock diseases. Random events can be 
characterized by a finite number of scenarios (Kall and Mayer 2004), affecting the regions 
simultaneously or independently. These shocks can reduce production 1x  and 2x differently 
indifferent regions.  
The goal of robust production planning is to minimize the total costs: 
2211 xcxc  ,          (1) 
under the food security constraint 
dxaxa  2211 )()(  .        (2) 
The main question is how (in the face of  uncertainty) to allocate production 1x  and 2x exante 
before knowing exact information about shocks so that the constraint (2)is fulfilled under all (or 
almost all) possible shock scenarios ),...,,( 21 s  . If supply 2211 )()( xaxa    falls short 
of demand d after actual yields become known, the residual amount 
2211 )()(),( xaxadxy   can come expost either from the market,or from a storage 
facility, or compensated by insurance or subsidies at per unit price b . The shortfall ),( xy in a 
sense determines the demand for new, possibly not yet existing, measures, both structural and 
financial, to cover the shortfall.The concept of two types of decisions (two-stage) modeling with 
interdependent strategic exante (taken in front of uncertainties) 1x , 2x  and operational expost 
(after uncertainty scenario becomes known) decisions ),( xy  is critically important for robust 
planning in the face of uncertainties and risks, as these decisions ensure the security constraint (2) 
for any event   (Ermoliev and von Winterfeldt, 2012).  
The model (1)-(2) is formulated as a linear two-stage stochastic optimization (STO) model: 
minimize the costs function 
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),(2211 xbEyxcxc  .                                                                                                (3) 
The scenario-dependent shortfalls })()(,0max{),( 2211 xaxadxy   characterize inter 
dependencies and trade-offs among strategic decisions x and operational decisions ),( xy  , 
shocks )(1 a  and )(2 a , costs c , priceb , demand d , and the risks of not fulfilling constraint 
(2). Changing parameters 1c  and 2c  on local (country or regional) and b  and d  on the global 
(national and international) levels due to various interventions,for example, subsidies or 
taxes,can—if risks are not accounted for—cause production to be redistributed toward a more 
risk-exposed region and lead to the increase of the shortfall and to systemic failure. 
3.2 Robust production allocation 
The goal of subsection is to show how production level that is robust and resilient to shocks is 
determined by risk exposure and (net) costs. Redistribution of CAP subsidies can stimulate 
allocation of production to a riskier region.Assume that only region 1is exposed to risk. The 
optimal positive production 0*1 x , 0
*
2 x occurs when  the derivatives )0,0(1xF  and )0,0(2xF  
of the goal function )(xF  are such that 0)()0,0( 111  bEacFx  and 0)0,0( 22  bcFx  
(see Ermolieva et al. 2016).  As condition 02 bc is fulfilled independently of  random shocks 
 , the risk-free,less efficient region 2 must always be active. The cost-efficient,risk-exposed 
region 1 is inactive in the case 0)(11  bEac . In this situation, the higher-cost, risk-free region 
2acts as ―insurance‖ for fulfilling food security. Both regions are active only if 0)(11  bEac . 
Thus, the optimal robust production of a region  depends on its risk exposure and (net) costs.  
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From the optimality condition 0))((),( 211221
2
 xxadbPcxxF
x
 of stochastic minimax 
problems (see, e.g., Dantzig and Madansky 1961, Ermoliev and Wets 1988, and references 
therein) we can derive optimal production level 
*
1x  and 
*
2x  from 
bcxxadP /))(( 2
*
2
*
11   .        (4) 
This means that the probability of shortfall under robust decisions is equal to the ratio of bc /2
defined by the cost 
2c  and import price b . The optimal production level 0
*
2 x  of risk-free 
region 2 is a quantile of the probability distribution defined by the shocks )(1 a  of risk-exposed 
region 1, decisions 
*
1x  of region 1, the costs of region 2, and the import price b . 
3.3 General stochastic GLOBIOM and robust subsidies 
Previous subsections explain with a stylized version of stochastic GLOBIOM the inter 
dependencies between the optimal and robust long-term strategic *x  (e.g. land allocation by 
regions, crops, management systems; (grain, water, (bio)energy) storage capacity) and the short-
term operational scenario-dependent decisions ),(* xy  (trade, storage control, insurance, 
subsidies). The general stochastic GLOBIOM includes many more inter dependencies between 
variables and parameters, including costs, prices, demand-production-trade interactions between 
locations and land use sectors, security constraints, location and crop-specific yield shocks for 27 
world regions. The goal function of stochastic GLOBIOM includes the expected producer and 
consumer surpluses and various costs of all world countries subject to biofuel targets, GHG 
emissions, and resource constraints (Ermolieva et al., 2016). Depending on the land use activities, 
security constraints are introduced as follows. The food security constraint ensures that the 
energy intake from food production cannot be lower than the minimum number of kilo calories 
needed to satisfy dietary requirements in cereals, vegetables, and animal (meat and dairy) 
products, measured in kilo calories per capita (WHO 1985). Feed sources for livestock comprise 
crops, grass, and biofuel co-products (feed cakes). The feed security constraint ensures that feeds 
for livestock cannot be lower than the minimum livestock dietary requirements in energy 
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measured in mega-calories. First-generation biofuels from crops and second-generation biofuels 
from lignocellulosic biomass (woody crops) and agricultural residues have to fulfill biofuel 
production targets. Food security constraints and biofuel security targets introduce competition 
for limited natural resources (land and water) among different land uses. Second-generation 
biofuels from forest production include biomass for woody energy and traditional fuelwood. The 
energy biomass can be converted through i) combined heat and power production; ii) 
fermentation for ethanol, heat, power, and gas production; and iii) gasification for methanol and 
heat production. Because of biofuel  targets, agriculture and forestry have a joint biofuel security 
constraint similar to (2), which induces systemic risks across sectors and activities (Ermoliev and 
Winterfeldt, 2012). Through joint security constraints, a risk-free region or activity becomes 
risk-exposed. Production shortages are estimated at regional and global levels requiring 
additional decisions such as (grain, water, energy) storages, investments, insurance, financial 
intruments and the options, that must be constructed in proper locations (regions, countries, grids) 
to guarantee a desirable regional and global systemic security level.  
Robust subsidies are calculated and applied in stochastic GLOBIOM (Figure 1) in two steps. 
First, the model runs without subsidies. At this step, profits from robust decisions 
)),(,( *** xyx  are calculated at country level under numerous constraints and performance 
indicators (Ermolieva et al., 2016). The profits from robust decisions are used to share down total 
Pillar I subsidies between the EU countries. Robust subsidies, therefore, are based on robust 
profits that are calculated taking into account FWEE security constraints, systemic inter 
dependencies between the two types of decisions, demand-supply-trade balances, risk exposure, 
and other parameters defining the structure of the whole model.  
There are several ways in which subsidies can be included and investigated using the model. In 
stochastic GLOBIOM, we use the so-called ―income-based approach‖ according to which 
subsidies are included as income and not as capital, as in the ―balance-sheet‖ approach. Thus, at 
the second step the model runs including subsidies, which reduce the net costs. 
4. Selected results 
Stochastic GLOBIOM accounts for spatial dependencies between yield shocks (FAO, 2016) and 
suggests policies, which are robust with respect to all shocks rather than with respect to only one 
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scenario. Robust scenario-independent long-term strategic policies regarding production 
allocation and management technologies (e.g. irrigation, storage capacities, etc.) account for risk 
exposure, profitability and adaptive capacity of locations. The strategic policies are 
supplemented by scenario-specific geographically-diversified trade across uncorrelated (or 
negatively correlated) regions and commodities, by storage control (withdrawals) decisions, and 
by financial support measures such as insurance or subsidies. These instant operational decisions 
can be easily adjusted on an annual basis. In this section we discuss pillar 1 and pillar II CAP 
measures that have been analyzed with stochastic GLOBIOM.  
4.1 Robust payments of pillar I 
First, let us compare the effects of―robust‖payments with the effects from the two alternative 
payments schemes, the ―historic‖ and ―flat‖ (Commission 2011): 
1. ―Historic‖ direct payments reflect countries’ past production and profitability. European 
Commission (2011) considered the decoupling of direct payments linked to historical support 
values as the most neutral design of support in terms of impact on farms’ asset values.The 
―historic‖ payments reflect the conditions for agricultural production in a specific region, in 
particular, the differences in economic and natural conditions across the countries of EU. 
 
2. The ―flat‖ (or ―EU average‖) payments scheme is based on providing the same level of aid per 
hectare to all farmers in the EU. The implementation of this scheme can lead to losses in 
countries where ―historic‖ payments are above and to gains where ―historic‖ payments are below 
the average.   
3. ―Robust‖ direct payments are calculated with stochastic GLOBIOM. The ―robust‖ payments 
distinguish the EU member states by such factors as profitability, risk exposure and adaptive 
capacity, availability of risk-hedging options, self-sufficiency policies and environmental 
commitments of the EU countries. The ―robust‖ payments can also include other agricultural, 
economic, and fairness criteria.   
The structure of the three alternative schemes is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Alternative schemes for distribution of CAP pillar I payments across EU countries, in 
EUR/ha: ―Historic‖, ―Robust‖; and ―Flat‖.  
In the model, we calculate the average level of direct payments at the EU27 level to be around 
250 EUR/ha
2
. The three schemes are implemented in stochastic GLOBIOM per hectare of 
cultivated land and are compared in terms of demand and supply of major crops, land use change, 
irrigated land, and water consumption. 
4.1.1Demand and supply of crops  
If aggregated from the country to the EU level, the effects of different payment schemes cancel 
each other out and are therefore not very pronounced. Nevertheless,at EU level the demand and 
supply of wheat, corn, rice, and soya under the ―robust‖ scheme is calculated to be higher than 
under the ―flat‖ scheme.Toward 2050thesupplyofwheatis expected to beat least of 20% higher 
under the ―robust‖ than under the―flat‖scheme.If the ―robust‖scheme is compared with the 
―historic‖ scheme, wheat production increase is slightly lower, namely, about 5%. Corn 
production under the ―robust‖ scheme could be about9and 3.5%higher toward 2050,compared 
with the ―flat‖ and ―historic‖ schemes, respectively. Rice production increases by about 4 % 
under ―robust‖ than under ―flat‖ scheme, and output of soya is expected to be higher by about 10 
and 6% compared with the ―flat‖ and ―historic‖ schemes, respectively. 
                                                          
2Other approaches to ―exogenous‖ allocation of payments can be tested (―MAX‖ or ―MIN‖ rate); however, these 
schemes also do not account for risk considerations (European Commission 2011). 
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At the level of EU countries and economic regions, the effects of different payment schemes are 
more visible. Some countries and regions show substantial increases, while others show a 
decrease in supply and demand for the investigated crops under the ―robust‖ scheme as 
compared to the ―flat‖ and ―historic‖ schemes.  
 
 
Figure 2a: Grain yields, in percentage change,        Figure 2b: Grain yields, in percentage change,  
from ―historic‖ to ―robust‖ subsidies.                      from ―flat‖ to ―robust‖ subsidies. 
 
 
 
Figure 3a: Grain area, in percentage change,        Figure 3b: Grain area, in percentage change,  
from ―historic‖ to ―robust‖ subsidies.                          from ―flat‖ to ―robust‖ subsidies. 
 
Figure 2a compares yield change and Figure 3a –grains production area change, under ―historic‖ 
compared to ―robust‖ subsidiese, in percentage change terms; and figures2b and 3b compare 
yield and grains production area change under ―flat‖ compared to ―robust‖ subsidies. Darker 
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green color indicates that in ―robust‖ grain yield and production area are higher and lighter green, 
correspondingly, shows countries with yields and production areas under ―robust‖ subsidies. For 
example, the implementation of robust payments will increase yields of farmers in central eastern 
countries (e.g., Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland) and middle western countries 
(e.g., Austria, Germany, France, Netherlands), where production of grains (e.g. wheat, corn, rice, 
soya) could increase by about 30%. In the south (e.g., Spain, Portugal, Italy, Cyprus), the effects 
can be negative, production of main cereals could decrease by about14%. Somewhat negative 
effects can be also expected in the Baltic and norther countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Finland as well as in Midwestern countries – Belgium, Luxembourg and in central east –
Romania. 
4.1.2 Irrigated area expansion and water demand  
In the planning time horizon from 2010 to 2050, the ―robust‖ payments reduce irrigated area and 
water consumption by about 4 and 11%, respectively,compared to the ―flat‖ scheme. The 
reduction in water demand is because ―robust‖ paiments stimulate more efficient water 
management in more profitable and less risk-exposed regions with lower costs of advanced 
irrigation technologies. At the level of EU countries and regions, the effects are rather 
heterogeneous. For example, in Baltic and northern countries (e.g.,Latvia, Estonia, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark) ―robust‖ subsidies stimulate the expansion of irrigated area more than the  
―flat‖ scheme (Figire 4b)but less than the ―historic‖ scheme (Figire 4a). In centra least countries 
such as e.g., Hungary and Slovakia, the general trend under ―robust‖ subsidies (if compared with 
―historic‖is toward decreasing and if compared with ―flat‖ – towards increasing the irrigated area. 
This differences across the scenarios can be intuitively explained by the inter dependencies 
between the (net) costs, which are alted by subsidies (in some countries, ―historic‖ subsidies are 
lower than ―robust‖), and by the yield schocks, which induce production risks in more exposed 
and vulnerable countries. With more details, the inter dependencies are explained in section 3. In 
middlewest (e.g. Germany, France, Austria) and in north (Sweden), ―robust‖ subsidies can 
increase irrigate area, but decrease water consumption, which indicates that these countries are 
able to introduce more efficient water saving irrigation technologies. In the southern region (e.g. 
Spain, Italy), ―flat‖ subsidies lead to greater expansion of irrigated area than―historic‖ and 
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―robust‖subsidies, which can be explained by the shortage of water and inefficiency of 
investments into advanced irrigation (i.e.,high water price). 
 
 
 
Figure 4a: Irrigated area, percentage change,         Figure 4b: Irrigated area, percentage change,  
from ―robust‖ to ―historic‖ subsidies.                      from ―robust‖ to ―flat‖ subsidies. 
 
 
Figure 5a: Water demand, percentage change,    Figure 5b: Water demand, percentage change,  
from ―historic‖ to ―robust‖ subsidies.                     from ―flat‖ to ―robust‖ subsidies. 
 
Figures 5a and 5b show the distribution of water demand by EU countries. Figure 5a in 
percentage terms compares the difference between water demand under ―historic‖ versus ―robust‖ 
subsidies, and Figure 5b – ―flat‖ versus ―robust‖ subsidies. In Figure 5a, Baltic and northern 
countries under ―robust‖ subsidies are characterized by higher water demand than under ―flat‖ 
and ―historic‖, which in figures is indicated by darker green colors. Central countries (e.g., 
Hungary, Czech Republic, etc.), ―robust‖ subsidies increase the water demand, if compared both 
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with ―historic‖ and ―flat‖; in Germany, ―robust‖ subsidies lead to the decrease and in France – to 
slight increase of the demand compared with ―historic‖ scheme, Figure 5a. In the southern region 
(e.g. Spain, Italy) ―robust‖ water demand is lower than in other schemes, which also corresponds 
to lower irrigated area expansion, Figure 4.  
4.2 Pillar II measures 
Storage is one of structural measures which can enable to achieve long-term sustainable rural 
development goals of Pillar II. As we show with numerical results, it address almost all 
―priorities for the new rural l development policy for 2014-2020‖ (Eropean Commission, 2017a). 
We explicitly investigate only the effects of implementing robust grain storage, which also 
allows us to analyze the synergies and trade-offs between other measures and variables.For 
example, grain reserves introduce flexibility into supply-demand-trade relations. They also allow 
grain prices to be controlled. Storage introduction decreases the demand for other structural 
measures, such as irrigation infrastructure. Storage of specific grains allows harvested products 
to be transferred from good to bad years to ensure food–feed–biofuel–water security. This way 
storage can reduce the demand for arable land otherwise required to hedge possible production 
shocks. Storage facilities can be viewed as insurance reserves when no other sources of supply, 
domestic or foreign, are available, for instance, in the case of correlated production shocks or 
restricted trade or trade bans.In this paper we discuss robust demand for grain storage and the 
ways to estimate it at regional and at EU levels. Further analysis needs to consider possible trade 
offs, crowding out effects of public storage (or subsidies for private storage) on privately 
organised storage, and ways for a robust public-private partnership in grain storage,which is a 
topic for future research.The data on investments, maintenance, and operational costs of different 
grain storage techniques have been compiled from the literature (e.g. Gustafson 1958; Deaton 
and Laroque 1992 and references therein).  
4.2.1 Robust grain storage 
In stochastic GLOBIOM, the demand for grain storage is estimated as a production shortfall in 
locations where current production does not meet demand (no self-sufficiency) and where trade 
is either not possible or too expensive. In the example of two regions (section 3), the robust 
scenario-dependent shortfalls are calculated as a solutions of equation (4) and can be explicitly 
defined as , where  denotes scenarios of 
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potential yield schock, . In the general stochastic GLOBIOM, the shortfalls are 
calculated for 27 EU countries as a solution of multidimentional probabilistic equations 
specifying probabilities (or a percentage of shock scenarios) when the targeted level of food-
feed-biofuels production and environmental constraints  is ―allowed‖ to be unfulfilled, i.e. 
acceptable level of systemic insolvency (Ermolieva et al., 2016).  
Stochastic GLOBIOM maximizes profits and minimizes costs including costs for grain storage. 
High demand for wheat, corn, rice, soya both in domestic and international markets, raises prices 
and require more agricultural land to be allocated to these crops. In other words, acreage under 
wheat, corn, rice, soya production can be viewed as a function of domestic crop prices, export 
and import prices, production costs, risk-expossure, feasible technologies, and 
security  constraints. If stochastic GLOBIOM calculates some grain reserve, this means that the 
net profits from this crop are minimal and the crop can be substituted by more profitable and 
demanded crops. For example, stochastic GLOBIOM calculates that reserves of about 240 and 
3376 thousand tons of rape and sunflower, respectively, are the least costly options to reach 
food-feed self-sufficiency and fulfill environment targets at the EU level. The result can be also 
interpreted as a recommendation to decrease biodiesel targets by roughly the equivalent of the 
calculated oil crops reserve, which would allow to fulfill security and resource constraints at 
lower prices. Figure 6 depicts distribution of robust rape and sunflower storage corresponding to 
robust allocation of subsidies.  
 
a. Rape      b.   Sunflower  
Figure 6. Distribution of robust production shortages (or demand for storage capacity) in each of 
the stochastic yield shock scenarios, in thousand tons, at EU level. Frequency refers to the 
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absolute number of shortages within a range identified on the horizontal axis. Cumulative refers 
to the percentage of total shortages at or below the value on the horizontal axis. 
 
4.2.2 Irrigation system expansion 
As grain storage hedges production risks, it allows savings on investment in irrigation 
systems.According to stochastic GLOBIOM, EU grain reserves of about 240 and 3376 thousand 
tons of rape and sunflower can avoid investment in irrigation of about 200thousand hectares of 
agricultural land and decrease water consumption by about 16% at the EU level. By varying the 
parameters reflecting costs of storage and/or water infrastructure,  trade-offscan be investigated 
between the demand and feasibility of domestic grain savings, irrigation land expansion,and 
interregional trade; that is, the model analyzes if precautionary grain stocks are cheaper than 
hedging production risks through increased irrigation, and/or expost imports. 
In locations where water supply does not meet demand, the demand for irrigation infrastructure 
and water storage capacities (reservoirs) can be estimated in a similar way to (and in 
combination with) the demand forgrain storage facilities.  The water shortfalls determine the 
demand for water-saving technologies, storage, etc., able to stabilize production and farmers’ 
welfare at the required level. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper argues that, in the face of risks and uncertainties,the assessment and implementation 
of new CAP measures can be improved by using the stochastic integrated assessment model 
GLOBIOM. The stochastic model derives strategies that are optimal and robust with respect to 
various possible scenarios rather than only one scenario, which happens when traditional 
deterministic assessment models are used. The latter evaluate impacts, costs, and benefits, and 
thus the effectiveness of measures in a scenario-by-scenario manner, which may lead to 
maladaptation and the need to reverse decisions if an other-than-expected scenario 
occurs.Stochastic GLOBIOM allows for simultaneous minimization of costs associated with two 
types of decision: long-term strategic, implemented before the real state of nature is observed, 
and short-term operational, after additional information about uncertainties is ―learned.‖ 
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Currently, allocation of CAP funds to countries and pillars may not be the most efficient way of 
supporting farmers to adapt to climate change. For example, the flat-rate system can shift 
payments from less risk-exposed to more risk-exposed countries (and vice versa), which can 
affect the production of vital commodities like wheat, corn, rice, soya, sunflower, and rape. 
Robust paiments, on the contrary, can substantially increase, if compared with the effects of flat 
payments, these lf-sufficiency and adaptive capacity of regions toward climatic risks and 
uncertainties. Introduction of grain storages further facilitates climatic risk hedging. The demand 
for storage capacity was evaluated based on the distribution of production shortfalls in locations, 
regional self-sufficiency policies, FFWE security considerations, and storage maintenance 
(including running) costs (exogenous variable) vs import costs (endogenous variable calculated 
by GLOBIOM). It was shown that rather moderate storage facilities would decrease water 
demand by agriculture; for example,under a scenario of robust subsidies combined with storage, 
the irrigated area can be decreased by 20% over time.The benefits of grain storage depend on the 
inter play between various variables, for example, prices, trade flows, shocks, etc., and are 
therefore determined endogenously by the model. Analysis of the demand for storage in the EU 
allows the feasibility of (high) biofuel targets under production risks and inelastic demand for 
wheat, corn, rape, sunflower, namely, biofuel sources, to be investigated. 
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